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APPORTIONING CLEANUP COSTS IN THE NEW
ERA OF JOINT AND SEVERAL CERCLA
LIABILITY
Michael Foy*
I. INTRODUCTION
This comment interprets a recent United States Supreme
Court decision addressing the apportionment of liability
under CERCLA,1 a federal environmental law statute
notorious for reducing frustrated courts to hoping that "if
they stare at [it] long enough, it will burn a coherent
afterimage on the brain."2 Justice Stevens's apportionment
holding in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v.
United States' reversed an apparent consensus among the
federal circuit courts, creating important but uncertain
ramifications that are "hotly debated" by courts and
commentators. By reading between the lines of the opinion's
* Senior Articles Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 51. J.D.
Candidate, class of 2011, Santa Clara University School of Law; B.A., class of
2008, Loyola Marymount University. I owe thanks to the Board of Editors of
the Santa Clara Law Review for their thoughtful contributions, and to Professor
Kenneth Manaster for helping to inspire this comment and for insights
throughout the drafting process. I would also like to thank my family and
friends for their ongoing support and encouragement.
1. As explained by the Environmental Protection Agency, CERCLA is:
the environmental program established to address abandoned
hazardous waste sites . . . . [It] was enacted in the wake of the
discovery of toxic waste dumps such as Love Canal and Times Beach in
the 1970s. It allows the EPA to clean up sites and to compel
responsible parties to perform cleanups or reimburse the government
for EPA-lead cleanups.
Basic Information, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/about.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2010).
2. C.P. Holdings, Inc. v. Goldberg-Zoino & Assocs., Inc., 769 F. Supp. 432,
435 (D. N.H. 1991).
3. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870
(2009).
4. Evansville Greenway & Remediation Trust v. S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co.,
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reticent wording, this comment guides courts and
practitioners searching for the elusive standard that governs
post-Burlington Northern liability apportionment under
CERCLA.
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act in 1980.'
Through CERCLA, Congress sought to enable the federal
government to respond effectively to environmental problems
caused by hazardous waste disposal, and to ensure that the
costs of these responses are ultimately shouldered by the
parties who necessitated them.6 Effectuating these goals has
caused much frustration for courts and the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) alike;' this is largely because
CERCLA's text was "hastily drafted,"' and the statute's
legislative history is "shrouded with mystery."' Despite this
inept guidance, courts interpreting CERCLA's liability
scheme agree, nearly unanimously, that CERCLA allows
imposition of joint and several liability upon parties
potentially responsible for contaminating a CERCLA site."o
661 F. Supp. 2d 989, 1012 (S.D. Ind. 2009).
5. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (2006)) [hereinafter CERCLA].
6. See id.; see also Burlington N., 129 S. Ct. at 1874 (quoting Consol.
Edison Co. of N.Y. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 94 (2d Cir. 2005))
("[CERCLA] was designed to promote the 'timely cleanup of hazardous waste
sites' and to ensure that the costs of such cleanup efforts were borne by those
responsible for the contamination."). When interpreting these policies, courts
adopt a liberal approach "since CERCLA is a remedial statute, it[] . . . should be
construed broadly to avoid frustrating the legislative purpose." United States v.
Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 837-38 (4th Cir. 1992).
7. See, e.g., Artesian Water Co. v. Gov't of Newcastle Cnty, 851 F.2d 643,
648 (3d Cir. 1988) ("CERCLA is not a paradigm of clarity or precision.").
8. Riverside Mkt. Dev. Corp. v. Int'l Bldg. Prods., Inc., 931 F.2d 327, 330
(5th Cir. 1991). CERCLA's poor drafting is commonly attributed to its political
background: it was hurriedly passed during a lame-duck session of Congress.
See John Copeland Nagle, CERCLA's Mistakes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1405,
1405 (1997).
9. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074,
1081 (1st Cir. 1986).
10. See United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio
1983) (reviewing CERCLA's text and legislative history and concluding that it
allows, but does not require, joint and several liability). The holding of Chem-
Dyne has been adopted by every circuit court that has addressed joint and
several CERCLA liability. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United
States, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009) (citing In re Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc., 3 F.3d
889, 901-02 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d
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The consensus rapidly evaporates, however, when courts
address the burden parties must meet to avoid joint and
several CERCLA liability by demonstrating the harm they
caused is divisible from the rest of the contamination."
Although decisions are discordant regarding the specifics of
this burden, courts have generally applied an exacting
approach and "have been reluctant to apportion costs."12
The U.S. Supreme Court recently confronted this
apportionment issue in Burlington Northern,3 where it
upheld the Eastern District of California's apportionment of
liability, even though the apportionment was based on
calculations that would not satisfy the strict approach to
apportionment applied by most circuit courts.14 Most courts
and commentators interpret Burlington Northern as easing
the burden CERCLA defendants must meet to apportion
would-be joint and several liability." Beyond this simplistic
statement, however, the decision's full scope and
ramifications remain uncertain. Specifically, the opinion
states there must be a "reasonable basis" for apportionment,
yet does not elucidate precisely what constitutes a reasonable
basis, or from where that standard is derived." Moreover,
252, 268 (3d Cir. 1992); O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178 (1st Cir. 1989); and
United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171-73 (4th Cir. 1988)).
11. Compare, e.g., United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249
(S.D. Ill. 1984) (interpreting CERCLA to allow equitable considerations to be
used in an apportionment analysis), with, e.g., O'Neil, 883 F.2d at 178-79
(adopting a strict approach to apportionment that ignores equitable
considerations).
12. Akzo Coatings v. Aigner Corp., 909 F. Supp. 1154, 1164 (N.D. Ind.
1995).
13. Burlington N., 129 S. Ct. at 1870.
14. The district court's apportionment calculations relied upon the size of
the land that the defendant owned, and the period of time it occupied that land.
See id. at 1876-77. In contrast, most lower courts required evidence that traced
the chemicals from the time they left defendant's possession. See, e.g., O'Neil,
883 F.2d at 179-80.
15. See, e.g., Appleton Papers, Inc. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., No. 08-
C-16, 2009 WL 3931036, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 18, 2009) (noting that Burlington
Northern "eased the standards" for apportionment).
16. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870
(2009) (citing United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D.
Ohio 1983)). The opinion cites section 433A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, which uses the term "reasonable basis." Id. at 1881 (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A(1)(b) (1963-64)). However, Justice Stevens refers to
the Restatement (Second) as the "starting point" in an apportionment analysis,
leaving unclear whether the "reasonable basis" in his opinion has the same
meaning as does the "reasonable basis" under the Restatement (Second). See id.
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the district court used a "margin of error" in its
apportionment calculations, but Justice Stevens's opinion
does not explain whether a margin of error approach was
appropriate solely because of the case's unique facts or
whether a margin of error should routinely be used by courts
apportioning liability."
This comment answers numerous questions raised by
Burlington Northern by proposing interpretations that are
consistent with congressional intent, fairness-related policy
concerns, and the decision itself. Part II of this comment
explains CERCLA's statutory background," discusses the
milieu of apportionment decisions rendered before Burlington
Northern,20 and examines the Burlington Northern decisions
in the lower courts and the U.S. Supreme Court.2 Part III
presents several questions predating Burlington Northern
that the decision left unanswered, and then identifies several
new questions raised by the decision.22 In Part IV, this
comment analyzes these uncertainties through the lens of the
congressional goals that form CERCLA's backdrop and
through reasonable extrapolations from Justice Stevens's
opinion.2 3 This analysis culminates in Part V, which proposes
Burlington Northern be viewed as a return to the
apportionment principles of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.24 Moreover, this comment argues, Burlington III
repudiates the myriad decisions that paid lip-service to the
Restatement (Second), but actually imposed a much harsher
standard.25 Part V also proposes an interpretation that
endorses the margin of error approach to apportionment, and
at 1881 (quoting United States v. Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706, 717 (8th Cir.
2001)).
17. See United States v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., Nos. CV-F-
92-5068 OWW, CV-F-96-6226 OWW, 2003 WL 25518047, at *91 (E.D. Cal. July
15, 2003), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. United States v. Burlington N. &
Santa Fe Ry. Co., 479 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 2007), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009).
18. See generally Burlington N., 129 S. Ct. at 1883 (holding that the district
court's calculation errors were "harmless" due to its use of a margin of error to
arrive at the correct apportionment allocation).
19. See infra Part II.A.
20. See infra Part II.B.1.
21. See infra Part II.B.2.
22. See infra Part III.
23. See infra Part IV.
24. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965).
25. See infra Part V.
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preserves a future role for the Restatement (Third) of Torts26
in CERCLA apportionment.2 7
II. A COMPLICATED STATUTE LEADS TO
COMPLICATED JURISPRUDENCE
Congress drafted CERCLA to comprehensively regulate
the processes through which the President of the United
States, usually acting through the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA),28 identifies contaminated sites,
cleans them, funds their cleanup, and imposes liability on
parties responsible for their contamination.29 CERCLA
provides a "backward-looking" approach for remedying
existing pollution caused by hazardous waste disposal.3 0
Congress intended CERCLA to apply retroactively by
complementing the forward-looking Resources Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA)," a statute that seeks to prevent
future pollution caused by such disposal.3 2 In practice, RCRA
and CERCLA collectively prevent unfettered contamination of
the land, and ostensibly seal the "last remaining loophole in
environmental law."33
26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY (2000).
27. See infra Part V.
28. Joanna M. Fuller, Note, The Sanctity of Settlement: Stopping CERCLA's
Volunteer Remediators from Sidestepping the Settlement Bar, 34 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 219, 229 (2009).
29. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006).
30. E.g., United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361, 1398 (D.
N.H. 1985) ("It is by its very nature backward looking.").
31. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90
Stat. 2795 (codified at 42 U.S.C. H# 6901-6907, 6911-6916, 6921-6931, 6941-
6949, 6971-6979, 6981-6986 (2006)).
32. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1016, pt. 2, at 4 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6125 (observing that the RCRA does little to remedy
existing problems caused by improper disposal); see also United States v. Ne.
Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 733 (8th Cir, 1986) ("[T]he statutory scheme
itself is overwhelmingly remedial and retroactive."); J. Hagood Hamilton, Ohio
District Court Continues Retroactive Application of CERCLA, 9 S.C. ENvTL. L.J.
125, 126 (2000) ("RCRA failed to address measures of controlling preexisting
sites containing environmental contamination.").
33. H.R. REP. No. 94-1491, at 4 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238,
6241 (referring to the unregulated state of pre-CERCLA-and-RCRA ground
pollution). In enacting the RCRA, Congress noted that heightened stress on the
land was actually caused by other environmental laws; it stated that "greater
amounts of solid wastes" were generated "as a result of the Clean Air Act, the
Water Pollution Control Act, and other Federal and State laws respecting . . .
the environment . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(3) (2006) (emphasis added, internal
citations omitted).
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A. Overview of CERCLA's Statutory Framework
Governmental authority to act under CERCLA accrues
when a hazardous substance "is released or there is a
substantial threat of such a release into the environment."34
CERCLA defines "hazardous substances" broadly to
encompass any substance deemed hazardous under RCRA, as
well as two additional acts enforced by the EPA: the Clean
Air Act and the Clean Water Act.3 5 When a substance falls
outside of this definition, CERCLA still applies if "there is a
release or substantial threat of release into the environment
of any pollutant or contaminant which may present an
imminent and substantial danger to the public health or
welfare . . . ."" Additionally, the release must be from a
"facility," broadly defined as any building or structure, or
"any site or area where a hazardous substance has been
deposited, stored ... or otherwise come to be located.""
1. Federal Authority to Identify and Clean Polluted Sites
The EPA is "the primary enforcer of CERCLA.""
Pursuant to that role, the EPA was statutorily required to
develop the National Contingency Plan (NCP) prior to
cleaning contaminated sites. The NCP established
procedures and standards for government responses to
hazardous substance releases, specified methods for
discovering and investigating contaminated facilities, and
created processes for determining the appropriate removal
and remedial action for contaminated sites.40
34. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1)(A).
35. See id. § 9601(14). Even if a substance is not listed as hazardous under
these acts, the EPA Administrator may list CERCLA-specific hazardous
substances. See id. Any amount of hazardous substance, however negligible,
will trigger application of CERCLA. See United States v. Alcan Aluminum
Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 261 (3d Cir. 1992).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9)(AMB). Congress explicitly excluded consumer
products and vessels from this broad definition. See id.
38. See Fuller, supra note 28, at 229.
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a). The EPA must regularly update this plan. See
id.
40. See id. § 9605(a)(1), (3). Notably, the NCP substantively affects the
allocation of liability under CERCLA, as any plaintiff, including the EPA,
seeking to recover funds expended during clean-up of a contaminated site may
only recover expenditures that are consistent with the NCP. See id. §
9607(a)(4)(AMB).
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Aside from its independent investigations, the EPA
discovers contamination through information provided by its
regulatees via CERCLA's requirement that managers of
facilities notify the EPA when they have knowledge of a
hazardous substance release.4 1 Based on procedures set forth
in the NCP, the EPA maintains the National Priorities List,42
identifying the known releases or threatened releases
requiring the most urgent attention through consideration of
"the relative potential of sites to pose a threat to human
health or the environment." 3
Section 104 of CERCLA empowers the federal
government to perform contamination-eliminating actions at
sites where a release or threatened release of a hazardous
substance has occurred by implementing the methods set
forth in the NCP." In addressing contamination stemming
from the release or threatened release, the government is
authorized to engage in removal and remedial actions.4 5
Removal actions entail "cleanup or removal of released
hazardous substances from the environment . . . [and] the
disposal of removed material, or the taking of such other
actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate
damage to the public health or welfare or to the
environment." Remedial actions encompass cleanup tactics
that, rather than merely mitigating damage, aim to fully
restore the site to its pre-contamination condition.47
Accordingly, the difference is primarily one of timeframe:
removal actions concern "short-term abatement of toxic waste
41. See id. § 9603(a). Failure to report a release subjects the person in
charge of the releasing facility to potential civil and criminal penalties. See id. §
9603(b).
42. See id. § 9605(a)(8)(B) ("[T]he President shall list as part of the plan
national priorities among the known releases or threatened releases throughout
the United States and shall revise the list no less often than annually.").
43. Introduction to the Hazard Ranking System
(HRS), U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/programs/npl-hrs/hrsint.htm (last visited Nov.
17, 2010).
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1). Even where the released substance is not
hazardous, federal response authority will accrue if the release or threatened
release is of a pollutant or contaminant that "may present an imminent and
substantial danger to the public health or welfare . . . ." Id.
45. Id. § 9604(a)(2).
46. Id. § 9601(23).
47. Id. § 9601(24).
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hazards", while remedial actions pertain to long-term
restoration of environmental quality.48
2. Federal Authority to Control the Cleanup Method and
Impose Cleanup Costs
The EPA has the authority to determine who must
perform the cleanup: it may itself clean the contamination
and later sue for restitution or, alternatively, it may direct
one or more "potentially responsible parties" to
decontaminate the site.4 9 The former option allows for rapid
action, as the EPA is expressly granted authority to perform a
cleanup; it can therefore forego prolonged litigation with third
parties until after the cleanup.so When the EPA performs a
cleanup, CERCLA allows the government to recover only
those costs consistent with the NCP," but eases this
requirement by presuming that the government's cleanups
are NCP-harmonious.5 2 The latter option is available only
after the EPA determines that there may be an imminent and
substantial endangerment to public health or welfare, or the
environment, due to an actual or threatened release of
contaminants. When the EPA finds such an imminent
endangerment, it may pursue either "civil judicial injunctive
actions [or] unilateral EPA administrative orders."54 Finally,
48. See City of N.Y. v. Exxon Corp., 633 F. Supp 609, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1986);
see also State of N.Y. v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1040 (2d Cir. 1985)
("[CERCLAI distinguishes between two kinds of response: remedial actions-
generally long-term or permanent containment or disposal programs-and
removal efforts-typically short-term cleanup arrangements."). Although
remedial actions possess the obvious advantage of permanence, removal actions
are nevertheless an important tool due to their aptitude for quickly addressing
"immediate threats to public welfare or to the environment." Arnold W. Reitze,
Jr. et al., Cost Recovery by Private Parties Under CERCLA: Planning a Response
Action for Maximum Recovery, 27 TULSA L.J. 365, 394-95 (1992).
49. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (imposing liability on certain
enumerated classes of defendants for costs incurred by the government through
its own cleanup efforts), with id. § 9606 (allowing the U.S. President, via the
EPA, to issue cleanup orders or to require the Attorney General to seek such an
order from a district court).
50. See id. § 9604(a)(1)(B).
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 747
(8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Hardage, 982 F.2d 1436, 1442 (10th Cir. 1992)
("[Tihe burden of proof of inconsistency with the NCP rests with the defendant
when the government seeks recovery of its costs.").
53. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).
54. Steven Ferrey, Inverting the Law: Superfund Hazardous Substance
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the EPA may allow the responsible parties to voluntarily
clean the site when it determines "such action will be done
properly and promptly."55
CERCLA liability attaches to four categories of
Potentially Responsible Parties (PRPs), who are identified
based on their relationship with the contaminated site."
PRPs include both the current owners of the site and any
prior owners who owned the facility during a time when
hazardous substances were disposed thereon." Additionally,
parties can be liable as arrangers if they arranged for disposal
or treatment of hazardous wastes located at the contaminated
facility." Finally, parties can be liable as transporters if they
accepted and transported a hazardous substance to disposal
or treatment facilities, and their activities caused a release or
threatened release of that hazardous substance."
Collectively, these four categories cut a broad swath of
liability, "extending to the several links in the chain of waste
disposition, origination through final placement, from which
environmental pollution is generated."0
Liability and Supreme Court Reversal of All Federal Circuits, 33 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 633, 642 (2009) (summarizing 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a)-(b)).
Once an administrative order is issued, compliance is immensely incentivized-
a party who willfully violates or refuses to comply with such an order is subject
to a fine of up to $25,000 for each day of noncompliance. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1);
see Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Thomas, 612 F. Supp. 736, 738 (D. Kan. 1985)
(recognizing Congress's intent that each enforcement option "would carry its
own incentive for compliance by a responding party"). When an administrative
order is met with an uncooperative party, the EPA may finance its own cleanup,
may sue the noncompliant party for its expenses, and seek punitive treble
damages. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)( 3 ). Similarly, where the EPA elects to pursue a
court-issued injunction, compliance is incentivized by the threat of contempt
sanctions for uncooperativeness. See Wagner Elec., 612 F. Supp at 738
("Refusal to comply with a judicial cleanup order, of course, would carry a
contempt sanction.").
55. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1)(B).
56. See id. § 9607(a).
57. Id. § 9607(a)(1)-(2).
58. Id. § 9607(a)(3).
59. Id. § 9607(a)(4).
60. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 754 F. Supp. 960, 963 (D. Conn. 1991).
Courts have explored the limits of these PRP categories through inquiry into
who may be considered a PRP under CERCLA, and have generally found that
liability extends broadly to, for example, individual officers of PRP corporations.
See United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 837-38 (4th Cir.
1992) (holding the relevant inquiry is whether the officer in question had the
ability to control the release, not whether the officer actually controlled it).
6332011]
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While PRPs are subject to extensive liability," they are
not equipped with a similarly vast collection of defenses.6 2
Nevertheless, PRP liability is not absolute; rather, PRPs have
three defenses under CERCLA.13 A PRP may avoid liability
by demonstrating that the release of hazardous substances
was caused by "an act of God,"' or by "an act of war."65
Alternatively, PRPs may escape liability by proving the
contamination was caused by a third party with whom the
PRP had no relationship-contractual or otherwise-so long
as the PRP exercised due care with respect to both the
substance and the foreseeable effects of the third party's
dealings with that substance. In 1986, through the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), 7
Congress created an additional defense that purportedly
shields from liability "innocent landowners" who unwittingly
purchase contaminated land, and do not contribute to further
contamination." SARA expanded the "third party" defense
by allowing purchasers to escape liability where they were
previously unable to satisfy the "no relationship" requirement
of the defense due to their sales contract with the prior
landowners.
B. Joint and Several CERCLA Liability
According to the predominant judicial interpretation of
CERCLA, PRPs may be held jointly and severally liable for
61. See infra Part I1.B (examining the breadth of CERCLA liability).
62. See Brian C. Walsh, Seeding the Brownfields: A Proposed Statute
Limiting Environmental Liability for Prospective Purchasers, 34 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 191, 195-97 (1997) (noting the dearth of liability defenses).
63. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
64. Id. § 9607(b)(1).
65. Id. § 9607(b)(2).
66. See id. § 9607(b)(3). Due to the strict requirements of this defense, and
particularly the requirement of no contractual relationship, it applies primarily
to atypical circumstances, such as when "contamination [is] caused by a vandal
or an upgradient property owner." Craig N. Johnston, Current Landowner
Liability Under CERCLA: Restoring the Need for Due Diligence, 9 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L. REV. 401, 402 (1998).
67. Superfund Amendments & Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. 99-499, 100
Stat. 1614 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006)) [hereinafter
SARA].
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35).
69. See id. § 9601(35) (excluding sales contracts for already contaminated
land from CERCLA's definition of "contract").
634 [Vol:51
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the entire cost of cleanup.70 Although previously drafted
references to joint and several liability were stricken from the
CERCLA's final draft,' courts have uniformly held that
CERCLA permits its imposition.7 2  The Chem-Dyne court
extensively analyzed the appropriateness of imposing joint
and several liability on PRPs, and recognized that
"traditional and evolving principles of common law" governed
CERCLA liability." With this guidance in mind, the court
surmised that these "principles" referred to federal principles
of common law, because CERCLA addressed a "complex
problem of national magnitude involving uniquely federal
interests."7 4 Turning to relevant federal common law, the
court observed that another federal environmental statute,
the Clean Water Act, was widely interpreted to impose joint
and several liability on its violators." The court, however,
70. See United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio
1983). The correctness of the Chem-Dyne Court's application of joint and
several liability accuracy was "subsequently confirmed as correct by Congress . .
. ." United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171 n.23 (4th Cir. 1988).
Generally, joint and several liability is appropriate whenever a "joint tort" has
occurred. See PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 322-23 (5th ed. 1984).
A joint tort is present where the defendants acted concertedly, where a common
duty was owed the plaintiffs by defendants, where there was a special
relationship among defendants, or where acts of independently-acting
defendants combine to create the harm at issue. See 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 10.1 692-94 (1956).
71. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 807 ("The fact that the term joint and
several liability was deleted from a prior draft of the bill . . . in and of itself, is
not dispositive of the scope of liability under CERCLA.").
72. See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct.
1870, 1881 (2009) ("The Chem-Dyne approach has been fully embraced by the
Courts of appeals."); see also cases cited supra note 10 (allowing joint and
several liability). CERCLA liability is not only joint and several, but also strict.
See United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 136 (2007) (citing United
States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 315 F. 3d 179, 184 (2d Cir. 2003)). Strict
liability denotes liability imposed on a defendant without proof that it breached
a duty of care. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 70, at 534. Strict liability is
not expressly mentioned in CERCLA's text, but is nevertheless well-established
by judicial interpretation of CERCLA's legislative history. See In re Bell
Petroleum Servs., 3 F.3d 889, 897 (5th Cir. 1993). Based on its legislative
history, courts "have uniformly held that CERCLA imposes strict liability on
responsible parties . . . ." Alexandra B. Klass, From Reservoirs to Remediation:
The Impact of CERCLA on Common Law Strict Liability Environmental
Claims, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 903, 933 (2004).
73. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 807-08.
74. Id. at 808 (emphasis added).
75. See id. at 810-11. The Chem-Dyne opinion was further guided by the
reference in CERCLA's legislative history to the Clean Water Act (despite that
reference's ambiguity). See 126 CONG. REC. 31,965 (1980) (statement of Rep.
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eschewed a blanket adoption of the Clean Water Act's
approach to joint and several liability and instead embraced a
refracted version of the approach advanced in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts." The Restatement-influenced
rule presumes each PRP is jointly and severally liable for the
entire cost of cleanup.77  However, this presumption is
rebuttable because under the Restatement (Second) of Torts
and common law tradition, where "there is a reasonable basis
for division according to the contribution of each [PRP, each
is subject to liability only for the portion of the total harm
that he has himself caused."7 In short, the dominant
approach embraces joint and several liability, but does view
that liability as unavoidable.
1. Pre-Burlington Northern Decisions Addressing
Apportionment of CERCLA Liability
PRPs may avoid joint and several liability by
demonstrating that their contribution to the contamination is
divisible from the entire contamination.7 9 Divisibility is a
concept deeply-rooted in post-Chem-Dyne CERCLA
jurisprudence," and is based on the Restatement (Second) of
Torts approach that Chem-Dyne interpreted as governing
apportionment." Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
harm is divisible only when either: "(1) there are distinct
harms,"8 2 or (2) there is a single harm, but there is a
reasonable basis for determining each party's contribution to
Florio).
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965); see United States v. Chem-
Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 809-11 (S.D. Ohio 1983); see also Lynda J.
Oswald, New Directions in Joint and Several Liability Under CERCLA?, 28
U.C. DAvis L. REV. 299, 328 (1995) (describing the Chem-Dyne court's
application of the Restatement (Second) approach due to its "hesita[nce] to adopt
a rule that would impose joint and several liability in every instance").
77. See Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp at 809-10.
78. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 433A, 881 (1976)).
79. See O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178 (1st Cir. 1989).
80. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870,
1880-81 (2009) (citing Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. 802). The Supreme Court
observed that Chem-Dyne is universally followed, and that under its approach,
PRPs are not jointly and severally liable if they can demonstrate the harm is
divisible. See id.
81. See United States v. Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706, 717 (8th Cir. 2001)
("The universal starting point for divisibility of harm analysis in CERCLA cases
is the Restatement (Second) of Torts ... .).
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A(1)(a) (1965).
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that harm.83 The party seeking to avoid joint and several
liability bears the burden of proving divisibility.'
The Fourth and First Circuits in United States v.
Monsanto Co." and O'Neil v. Picillo," respectively, applied
the Chem-Dyne approach and collectively imposed an
exacting burden on PRPs seeking apportionment. In
Monsanto, the Fourth Circuit rejected a PRP's assertion that
liability could be divided based on the amount of substance
that the PRP contributed,88 holding that the quantity of
emission was insufficient without proving the quality of the
damages caused by those emissions." In O'Neil, the First
Circuit rejected a PRP's proposed apportionment," and
suggested that where pollutants from multiple PRPs have
intermingled, a divisibility showing requires "specific
evidence documenting the whereabouts of [the PRP's] waste
at all times after it left their facilities . . . ."9 The O'Neil
Court called this the "stringent burden placed on [PRPs] by
Congress."" Due to these and similar holdings,9 3 the period
following Chem-Dyne was characterized by the imposition of
joint and several CERCLA liability that was, for all intents
and purposes, unavoidable."
83. See id. § 433A(1)(b).
84. See United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio
1983) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B).
85. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988).
86. O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989).
87. See Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 171-73. The Monsanto Court stated that
PRPs "b[ear] the burden of establishing a reasonable basis for apportioning
liability" and that in the typical CERCLA scenario this burden is unmet absent
"some evidence disclosing the individual and interactive qualities of the
substances deposited there." Id. at 172; see also O'Neil, 883 F.2d at 179-80.
This rigorous standard reflected the widespread judicial belief that CERCLA
liability should be liberally construed. See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha,
958 F.2d 1192, 1198 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898,
902 ("[Tihe remedial intent of CERCLA requires a liberal statutory construction
88. See Monsanto, 858 F. 2d at 171-73.
89. See id. at 172 & n.25 ("[Violumetric apportionment based on the overall
quantity of waste, as opposed to the quantity and quality of hazardous
substances contained in the waste . .. ma[kes] little sense.").
90. O'Neil, 883 F.2d at 179-80.
91. Id. at 182.
92. Id. at 183.
93. See, e.g., City of N.Y. v. Exxon Corp., 766 F. Supp. 177, 191-92 (citing
United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 169 (4th Cir. 1988)).
94. See Oswald, supra note 76, at 334 ("[T~he practical effect of the majority
approach [to divisibility] has been blanket application of joint and several
6372011]
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Ensuing decisions sought to clarify the nature of the
showing required to demonstrate that apportionment is
possible." First, courts must decide the threshold question of
whether a harm is theoretically amenable to apportionment;9 6
on this point, the Second Circuit held in Alcan Aluminum"
that contamination is not per se indivisible merely because
sources of the contamination have commingled." Whether
the harm is actually apportionable was addressed in In re
Bell Petroleum Services," a case that confronted the degree of
sureness required for apportionment and held that only a
reasonable, rather than certain, basis is necessary."oo
Notwithstanding these apportionment-friendly decisions,
courts continued to treat apportionment as "a very difficult
proposition."' 0' Furthermore, courts imposed stringent
standards on the types of evidence admissible to support
apportionment, requiring it to be "concrete and specific."10 2
Courts ascribed this burden to congressional intent, since one
of CERCLA's objectives is ensuring that the government is
fully compensated for its cleanup costs.'0 3
liability for CERCLA cleanup costs.").
95. See generally United States v. Alcan Aluminum Co., 990 F.2d 711 (2d
Cir. 1993); In re Bell Petroleum Servs., 3 F.3d 889 (5th Cir. 1993). When
evaluating divisibility of harm, courts generally perform a two-stage inquiry:
first they determine whether the harm is theoretically capable of
apportionment, and then they consider whether the harm is actually capable of
apportionment based on the evidence presented. See Frank Prager,
Apportioning Liability for Cleanup Costs Under CERCLA, 6 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
198, 213 (1987) (observing that it is possible for a harm to be theoretically
capable of apportionment, while not being actually capable of apportionment
due to the circumstances of the case).
96. See Prager, supra note 95, at 213 (explaining the difference between
theoretical apportionment and actual apportionment, and Congress's
recognition of this difference).
97. Alcan Aluminum, 990 F.2d 711.
98. See id. at 722 ("[Clommingling is not synonymous with indivisible harm,
and Alcan should have the opportunity to show that the harm ... was capable
of reasonable apportionment.").
99. In re Bell Petroleum Servs., 3 F.3d 889.
100. Id. at 903 (stating apportionment may be proper even where a PRP's
contribution to the harm cannot be proved with an absolute certainty). The
court further noted that "evidence sufficient to permit a rough approximation is
all that is required under the [Restatement (Second) of Torts]." Id. at 904 n. 19.
101. Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp., 53 F.3d 930, 934 n.4 (8th Cir.
1995); see also United States v. Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706, 716 (8th Cir. 2001).
102. Hercules, 247 F.3d at 718 (citing United States v. Alcan Aluminum Co.,
892 F. Supp. 648, 657 (M.D. Pa. 1995)).
103. See United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112
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Even though apportionment continued to be difficult to
prove, a few courts applied a more lenient approach that
allowed equitable considerations to influence the
apportionment inquiry.104  In United States v. A & F
Materials Co.,"o' the Southern District of Illinois held that
joint and several liability was appropriate under CERCLA,
but rejected a strict application of the Chem-Dyne approach;
instead it held that certain equitable factors could be
considered in the apportionment analysis.' Similarly, the
Northern District of Illinois rejected a by-the-book application
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts approach, reasoning that
judicial discretion is necessary to avoid inequity. 0 7
Accordingly, it embraced equitable considerations by holding
that "[t]he appropriate approach to the problem of liability in
cases such as the present one is that taken by the A & F
Materials court."' The Supreme Court has since discredited
(D. Minn. 1982) ("Congress intended that those responsible for problems caused
by the disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs and responsibility for
remedying the harmful conditions they created."); see also Memphis Zane May
Assocs. v. IBC Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp. 541, 548 (W.D. Tenn. 1996) ("By design,
this task [of demonstrating a reasonable basis] is difficult.").
104. See, e.g., United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D.
Ill. 1984).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1256 ("After reviewing the legislative history the Court concludes
a rigid application of the [Restatement (Second)] approach to joint and several
liability is inappropriate."). When CERCLA was reviewed by the House of
Representatives, then-Senator Al Gore argued that courts should be able to use
an exhaustive list of equitable considerations when determining whether to
apportion liability. United States v. Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d 307, 318
n.15 (6th Cir. 1998). For the courts that allowed equitable considerations to
influence their decision, it was these "Gore factors" that they referenced. See,
e.g., id. at 317-19 & n.15. These "Gore factors" include:
(i) the ability of the parties to demonstrate that their contribution to a
discharge, release, or disposal of a hazardous waste can be
distinguished from the overall contamination; (ii) the amount of
hazardous waste involved; (iii) the degree of the toxicity of the
hazardous waste involved; (iv) the degree of involvement by the [PRPs]
in the generation, transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal of the
hazardous waste; (v); the degree of care exercised by the [PRPs] with
respect to the hazardous waste . .. ; and (vi) the degree of cooperation
by the parties with [governmental authorities].
Id.
107. Allied Corp. v. Acme Solvents Reclaiming, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1100, 1117
(N.D. Ill. 1988) (observing that Congress was concerned with the inequities of
joint and several CERCLA liability, and therefore did not intend to forbid courts
from using equitable considerations in their apportionment analysis).
108. Id. at 1118.
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this approach;"o' however, equitable considerations survive in
section 113(f) of CERCLA.1 o Section 113(f), along with
section 107(a)(4)(B), 11 endows PRPs that are unable to assert
a statutory defense with a means to avoid liability for the
entire cleanup by seeking contribution from other PRPs.112
Thus inequities created by strict joint and several liability are
alleviated through section 113(f) and the "similar and
somewhat overlapping remedy in [section] 107.""e
2. Burlington Northern: From the Eastern District of
California to the Supreme Court of the United States
The U.S. Supreme Court recently confronted the issue of
apportioning liability among PRPs in Burlington Northern &
109. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870,
1882 n.9 (2009) ("Equitable considerations play no role in the apportionment
analysis . . .").
110. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (2006).
111. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(B). Under section 9607(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA, any person
who incurs cleanup costs that are necessary and consistent with the NCP may
seek recovery of those costs from PRPs. Id. Based on the plain meaning of "any
person," the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted this to apply to PRPs themselves;
thus PRPs may recover cleanup costs expended in excess of their actual
contribution to the contamination. See United States v. Atl. Research Corp.,
551 U.S. 128, 136 (2007) ("[Tlhe plain language of subparagraph (B) authorizes
cost-recovery actions by any private party, including PRPs."); see also AMCAL
Multi-Hous., Inc. v. Pac. Clay Prods., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1195 (C.D. Cal.
2007).
112. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(4)(B), 9613(f).
113. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 816 (1994); see Karen
Fox, Casenote, Aviall Services v. Cooper Industries: From Bad to Worse, Is
There any Hope for PRPs Conducting Voluntary Cleanups?, 18 VILL. ENVTL. L.J.
235, 247-48 (2007) (examining the interrelatedness of these two contribution
provisions). Although overlapping, there is a crucial difference between the
subsections regarding who may bring an action: while under section 107
anybody may sue for contribution, PRP or otherwise, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that section 113 contribution is available only to PRPs already subjected to
an EPA-initiated cost recovery action or cleanup order. Cooper Indus., Inc. v.
Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004). While section 107 determines the
amount of contribution based solely on actual contamination caused by PRPs,
section 113 allows courts to examine equitable concerns when allocating
liability. See In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig., 994 F. Supp. 638, 662 n.34
(D. V.I. 1998) ("[While a defendant in a [section] 107 action can only avoid joint
and several liability by demonstrating that the harm at a given site is divisible,
parties to a [section] 113 action may allocate among potentially responsible
persons based on equitable considerations."). Although section 113 provides
relief for PRPs that have already over-contributed as a result of joint and
several liability, PRPs currently facing EPA-initiated cost recovery actions
under section 107 must wrestle with this morass of apportionment
jurisprudence when attempting to avoid joint and several liability.
2011] APPORTIONING CLEANUP COSTS 641
Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United States.1 14  Burlington III
stemmed from contamination at an agricultural chemical
storage and distribution facility in Arvin, California (the
Arvin site), owned partially by PRP Brown & Bryant (B & B),
and partially by PRPs Burlington Northern and Santa Fe
Railway, and Union Pacific Transportation Company
(collectively, Railroads)."> The District Court found the Arvin
site's contamination was attributable chiefly to
Dichloropropane-dichloropropene (D-D)," 6 a substance stored
in "leak-prone trailers throughout the Arvin site, including
the Railroads' parcel.""' Acting jointly, the EPA and the
California State Department of Toxic Substances Control
(Agencies) performed cleanup at the Arvin site and brought a
cost recovery action"' against B & B, the Railroads, and Shell
Oil Company (Shell), the company that delivered the
contamination-causing agricultural products."'
The district court found in favor of the Agencies, holding
B & B and the Railroads liable as owners;12 0 it also held Shell
liable as an arranger.' 2 ' Rather than impose joint and several
liability on these newly-branded PRPs, the court determined
the damages were divisible as to the Railroads and Shell, and
therefore held them liable for only their respective
114. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870
(2009) [hereinafter Burlington III.
115. See United States v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., Nos. CV-F-
92-5068 OWW, CV-F-96-6226 OWW, CV-F-96-6228 OWW, 2003 WL 25518047,
at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2003), affd in part, rev'd in part sub non. United
States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d. 918 (9th Cir. 2008), rev'd,
129 S. Ct. 1870 [hereinafter Burlington 1. The site totals 4.7 acres, 3.8 acres of
which were owned by Brown & Bryant, and 0.9 acres of which were owned by
the Railroads. Id.
116. D-D is a pesticide that causes diseases in animals and respiratory
problems in humans. See Benjamin J. Rodkin, Casenote, Deciphering
CERCLA's Vocabulary: United States v. Burlington-"Reasonable" Division and
"Arranger" Liability, 20 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 275, 279 & n.27 (2009).
117. See id.; see also Burlington I, 2003 WL 25518047 at *4. In addition to D-
D, other hazardous substances such as Demagon and Dinoseb contributed to the
contamination. Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. at 1874-75; Rodkin, supra note 116,
at 280.
118. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text (describing the statutory
authority for government-initiated cost recovery actions).
119. See Burlington 1, 2003 WL 25518047 at *1.
120. See id. at *4.
121. United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co, 520 F.3d 918, 932
(9th Cir. 2008), rev'd 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(3)
(2006)) [hereinafter Burlington ll].
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contributions. 122  Although neither the Railroads nor Shell
comprehensively briefed the issue of apportionment,
preferring a "scorched earth, all-or-nothing approach to
liability,"'23 wherein they denied liability entirely,124 the court
"nonetheless proceeded to perform the equitable
apportionment analysis demanded by the circumstances of
the case."1 25
The district court began its apportionment inquiry by
finding as a threshold matter that apportionment was
theoretically possible.'26 It then held a reasonable basis for
actual apportionment existed based on three figures:127 the
percentage of the total area of the site owned by the Railroads
(19 percent),'2 8 the duration of the site's use as a chemical
storage facility divided by the length of the Railroads' lease
(45 percent),'29 and the percentage of the site's contamination
attributable to the types of chemicals stored on the Railroads'
portion of the site (66 percent).'3 0 The court then multiplied
.19, .45, and .66 to determine that the Railroads were liable
for 6 percent of the cleanup costs.' Even though its
calculations suggested the Railroads were only liable for 6
percent, the court nevertheless held them liable for 9 percent
of the total cleanup costs by accounting for "calculation
122. See id. (describing the methods used by the district court to apportion
liability).
123. Burlington I, 2003 WL 25518047 at *82 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
124. See id.
125. Burlington II, 520 F.3d at 932 (internal quotation marks omitted).
126. See Burlington 1, 2003 WL 25518047 at *84. The court observed that
apportionment is proper where two or more defendants contribute to the same
harm, yet their contributions are separable in terms of amount, and no single
defendant is responsible for any harm contributed by the other defendants. See
id. at *83 (citing In re Bell Petroleum Servs., 3 F.3d 880, 895 (5th Cir. 1993)).
Under that reasoning, the court determined the matter was "a classic 'divisible
in terms of degree' case, both as to the time period in which defendants' conduct
occurred, and ownership existed, and as to the estimated maximum
contribution of each party's activities that released hazardous substances that
caused Site contamination." Id. at *84. See Prager, supra note 95, at 213
(distinguishing harms capable of theoretical apportionment from those capable
of actual apportionment).
127. See Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1876 (2009) ("The court found that
the site contamination created a single harm but concluded that the harm was
divisible and therefore capable of apportionment.").
128. Id. at 1882.
129. Id.
130. Id.; see Burlington 1, 2003 WL 25518047 at *88-91.
131. Burlington 1, 2003 WL 25518047 at *91.
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errors" of 50 percent to avoid underestimating their
liabilities. 13 2  The court volumetrically analyzed Shell's
contribution by "multipl[ying] the percentages of leaks
attributable to Shell to determine that Shell was liable for 16
percent] of the total cleanup costs."' Finding no basis for
apportioning B & B's liability, the district court held it jointly
and severally liable.'34
The Agencies appealed from the judgment to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, asserting
apportionment was inapposite in this case and that the
Railroads and Shell should be held jointly and severally
liable.'35 Shell also appealed, arguing its activities were
insufficient to warrant "arranger" PRP status, and therefore
the District Court erred in assigning it any liability. 13 6
Regarding the apportionment issue, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court's decision and held the Railroads
and Shell jointly and severally liable, viewing the court's
apportionment methods as insufficient for both of these
PRPs.'3 7 In examining the district court's land area-based
calculation of the Railroads' liability, the Ninth Circuit
rejected a geographical apportionment of the Railroads'
liability since "the synergistic use of different parts of the
Arvin site makes division based on percentage of land
ownership particularly untenable."' 8 Similarly, the court
held the "simple fraction based on the time that the Railroads
owned the land cannot be a basis for apportionment."'3 9
Finally, the court rejected the district court's volumetric
apportionment based on evidentiary inadequacy, holding that
132. Id.
133. Amy L. Gleghorn, Environmental Update: United States Court of
Appeals, 14 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 423, 423 (2007). Although Shell denied
liability outright on grounds that it was not a PRP, the District Court
characterized Shell as an "arranger" PRP. See id. at 424.
134. See id. at 423. This imposition of joint and several liability was in
practical effect meaningless because B & B had since become defunct. See id.
As a result, the "agencies were . . . left holding the bag for a great deal of
money." Burlington II, 520 F.3d 918, 930 (9th Cir. 2008), rev'd 129 S. Ct. 1870
(2009).
135. Burlington II, 520 F.3d at 930 ("Seeking to hold the Railroads and Shell
jointly and severally liable for the entire judgment, the agencies appeal.").
136. Id.
137. See id. at 943, 947.
138. Id. at 944.
139. Id. at 945 (emphasis added).
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"[t]here is no evidence as to which chemicals spilled on the
parcel, where on the parcel they spilled, or when they
spilled."14 0  Regarding Shell, the Ninth Circuit observed a
split among courts on the specificity of proof necessary to
establish divisibility of harm, but found addressing that split
to be unnecessary because the "district court's extrapolations
could not be upheld under even a forgiving standard."'4 '
The Railroads appealed from the Ninth Circuit's reversal
to the U.S. Supreme Court.142 They argued the district court's
apportionment was legally sound because it comported with
the "evolving" common law principles governing CERCLA
liability.143 They asserted this common law evolution has led
to near-unanimous endorsement of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts approach to apportioning liability, condoning
apportionment based on reasonable assumptions and
approximations-such as those relied on by the district
court.'" Conversely, the EPA argued that the district court's
temporal, geographical, and volumetric calculations were
"unsubstantiated assumptions and gross approximations.
140. Id. In finding that there was no reasonable basis for apportionment, the
Ninth Circuit explained that the apportionment used by the district court failed
to meet the applicable legal standard because it "bore insufficient logical
connection to the pertinent question: What part of the contaminants found on
the . . . parcel were attributable to the presence of toxic substances or to
activities on the Railroad[s'] parcel?" Id. at 946.
141. Burlington II, 520 F.3d at 947 n.32. For the circuit split, compare, e.g.,
Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp., 53 F.3d 930, 934 n.4 (8th Cir. 1995)
(allowing apportionment only when supported by concrete and specific
evidence), with, e.g., In re Bell Petroleum Servs., 3 F.3d 880, 903-04 (5th Cir.
1993) (allowing apportionment based on sufficiently reliable approximations).
The court also rejected Shell's contention that, because it did not intend to
dispose of hazardous substances, it was not an arranger PRP. See Burlington
II, 520 F.3d at 950-51.
142. United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co, 520 F.3d 918 (9th
Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 30 (2008).
143. See Brief for Petitioners at 22, Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009)
(Nos. 07-1601, 07-1607), 2008 WL 4933576 [hereinafter Brief for Petitioners].
144. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 143, at 31. Under the Restatement
(Second) of Torts approach, courts may make reasonable assumptions when
apportioning liability with regard to the evidence, first by quantifying a
defendant's involvement with the harm, and then employing the "reasonable
assumption that the respective harm done is proportionate to that number."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A cmt. d (1965).
145. Brief for the United States at 15, Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (Nos.
07-1601, 07-1607), 2008 WL 5266416; accord Brief for the State of California at
23, Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (Nos. 07-1601, 07-1607), 2008 WL 5409459
(arguing that the district court apportioned based on its "best guesses" rather
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The Burlington III majority, led by Justice Stevens,
reversed the Ninth Circuit, finding joint and several liability
to be unwarranted and reinstating the district court's
apportionment of the Railroads' liability.146 The opinion noted
that traditional and evolving concepts of common law control
liability apportionment under CERCLA.147  Applying these
evolving principles, the Court found that, even though the
American Law Institute drafted the Restatement (Third) of
Torts during the period between Chem-Dyne and Burlington
11,148 section 433A of the older Restatement (Second) of Torts
was the guiding standard for the apportionment analysis. 4 1
Under section 433A, liability may be apportioned when there
is a reasonable basis for doing so.so The party seeking to
apportion bears the burden of demonstrating that basis.'
Applying this standard, the Court held the district court's
apportionment was reasonable:
The District Court's detailed findings make it abundantly
clear that . . . the spills of hazardous chemicals that
than on sufficient evidence).
146. See Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. at 1882-83 ("[W~e conclude that the facts
contained in the record reasonably supported the apportionment of liability.").
147. See id. at 1881 (citing United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp.
802 (S.D. Ohio 1983)).
148. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. (2000). The
Restatement (Third) elaborated upon the Restatement (Second)'s endorsement of
apportioning where "there is a reasonable basis for determining the
contribution of each cause to a single harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 433A(1)(b) (1965). It did this by explaining that apportionment is proper
where "legally culpable conduct of a party ... was a legal cause of less than the
entire damages for which the plaintiff seeks recovery" and those less-than-
entire damages are calculable. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 26(b) (2000). This Restatement (Third)
interpretation is much broader than the Restatement (Second), and is therefore
significantly friendlier towards PRPs seeking apportionment. See sources cited
infra note 173.
149. See Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. at 1881 (citing United States v. Hercules,
Inc., 247 F.3d 706, 717 (8th Cir. 2001)). The Court observed that Restatement
(Second) section 433A is the "universal" starting point for analyzing divisibility
of harm under CERCLA. See id. The Railroads argued that the district court's
apportionment comported with the liability-apportionment of the Restatement
(Third). See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 143, at 33. However, Justice
Stevens's opinion applied section 433A of the Restatement (Second) without
addressing this argument. See Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. at 1881 (applying the
Restatement (Second) approach to apportionment).
150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965).
151. Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. at 1881 (citing Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at
810).
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occurred on the Railroad parcel contributed to no more
than [10 percent] of the total site contamination . . .. With
those background facts in mind, we are persuaded that it
was reasonable for the court to use the size of the leased
parcel and the duration of the lease as the starting point
for its analysis.152
The Court, however, found the evidence insufficient to
justify the district court's volumetric-related basis for
apportionment.153  Even so, the district court's 9 percent
apportionment, with the inclusion of the 50 percent margin of
error, corresponded with the apportionment it would have
reached had it not erroneously included the volumetric
multiplicand.'5 4 Therefore, the Court upheld the
apportionment because "the District Court's ultimate
allocation of liability is supported by the evidence ....
The majority opinion also addressed the Agencies'
arguments that the apportionment was erroneous because it
inappropriately used equitable analysis,'5 6 and conducted the
apportionment sua sponte rather than placing the burden of
proof on the Railroads."' The Court agreed that the district
court erred in using equitable considerations,"' but reasoned
that "despite the District Court's reference to equity, its
actual apportionment decision was properly rooted in
152. Id. at 1883 (emphasis added). The Court further noted that, ironically,
the Ninth Circuit's opinion conceded that percentage of land area owned by a
PRP and the duration of that ownership were relevant, under the appropriate
circumstances, to demonstrating apportionment. Id. (citing Burlington II, 520
F.3d 918, 936 n.18, 943 (9th Cir. 2008), rev'd 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009)).
153. Id. at 1882-83.
154. See id. at 1882. In mathematical terms, .19 x .45 - 9%. Id.
155. Id. at 1882-84 (emphasis added); accord Brief for Petitioners, supra note
143, at 47 (arguing that the 50 percent margin of error ensures that uncertainty
in the evidence supporting apportionment does not prejudice the Agencies in the
least).
156. See Brief for the United States, supra note 145, at 38 ("The district
court's decision to undertake that apportionment without the parties' assistance
rested on . . . legal errors."); Brief for the State of California, supra note 145, at
48 ("[Tlhe district court engaged in an equitable allocation, an exercise not
properly part of an apportionment determination.").
157. See Brief for the State of California, supra note 145, at 22 ("The district
court's unprecedented approach runs counter to the law that places the burden
of proof for apportionment on parties held liable under CERCLA . . . ."); see
generally Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009).
158. Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. at 1882 n.9 ("As the Governments point out,
insofar as the District Court made reference to equitable considerations
favoring apportionment, it erred.").
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evidence that provided a reasonable basis for identifying the
portion of the harm attributable to the Railroads.""
Although the district court, rather than the Railroads,
advanced the apportionment theory, Justice Stevens held the
apportionment proper."o Justice Ginsburg's dissent, on the
other hand, viewed the district court's method as contrary to
a litigant's obligation to assert its own interests-a
fundamental tenet of American civil procedure."' Altogether,
therefore, Burlington III seemed to discredit the longstanding
notion that apportionment was an incredibly difficult
proposition, yet stopped short of detailing the specifics of this
new apportionment standard. 62
3. Diverging Interpretations Among Courts and
Commentators
Several courts have interpreted the "hotly debated""'
import of Burlington III's apportionment holding.164 Appleton
Papers Inc. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co.' 5 contains a
particularly thorough analysis of the decision.' The
Appleton Papers court interpreted Burlington III to
"significantly ease[] the burden on defendants who seek to
avoid joint and several liability by allowing courts more
leeway in determining whether the damage in question is
capable of being apportioned and, then, in divvying up the
damage."e167 Nevertheless, that court read Burlington III
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1882-83 (acknowledging the Railroads did not put forth sufficient
evidence for divisibility, but nevertheless upholding an apportionment that the
district court independently calculated). Significantly, the fact that the district
court apportioned based on its own factors (rather than those advanced by the
Railroads) appears misaligned with prior apportionment decisions that
consistently held that "the burden to demonstrate apportionment is on each
defendant." United States v. Hunter, 70 F.Supp.2d 1100, 1106 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
161. See id. at 1885-86 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The Court further held
that Shell was not a PRP, thereby mooting consideration of the district court's
apportionment of Shell's liability, since only PRPs are liable under CERCLA.
See id. at 1880 (majority opinion).
162. See generally id. at 1880-84.
163. See, e.g., Evansville Greenway & Remediation Trust v. S. Ind. Gas &
Elec. Co., No. 3:07-cv-0066-DFH-WGH, 2009 WL 3163180, at *21 (S.D. Ind.
Sept. 29, 2009).
164. See, e.g., id. at *20.
165. Appleton Papers, Inc. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., No. 08-C-16, 2009
WL 3931036 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 18, 2009).
166. See id. at *1-4.
167. Id. at *1.
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narrowly as merely allowing, rather than requiring an
apportionment inquiry."' Consistent with Appleton Papers'
interpretation of Burlington III as a grant of judicial
discretion, one court cited Burlington III as authority for
apportioning liability sua sponte.'6  Regarding certainty of
evidence needed to apportion, another court interpreted
Burlington III to allow apportioning even though "[tihe
measurement is not the exact amount of. . . contamination for
which each [PRPI was responsible . . . ."170 With respect to
the standard applicable to apportionment, a third court
interpreted Justice Stevens's extensive citations to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts... as disallowing consideration
of the Restatement (Third) of Torts approach 72  to
168. See id. at *2 ("[T]here is nothing within [Burlington III] that requires
courts to make some sort of threshold determination regarding joint and several
liability.").
169. Reichhold, Inc. v. U.S. Metals Ref. Co., Civ. No. 03-453(DRD), 2009 WL
1806668, at *49 (D. N.J. June 22, 2009) (performing a sue sponte
apportionment). But see United States v. Saporito, No. 07 C 3169, 2010 WL
489703, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 9, 2010) (refusing to apportion sua sponte where
"[alside from zero, Defendant suggests no other possible proportion."). More
explicitly, one commentator reasoned that "[u]nder Burlington Northern . . . a
court may apportion liability sua sponte, even if not advanced by a defendant."
Alfred R. Light, Restatement for Joint and Several Liability Under CERCLA
After Burlington Northern, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11,058, 11,063
(2009).
170. Reichhold, 2009 WL 1806668, at *49.
171. See Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1881 (2009) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965)).
172. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY
(2000). The Restatement (Third) approach is notable for its receptiveness to
apportionment and for its reluctance to impose joint and several liability. See
id. § 26 cmt. a (supporting apportionment whenever a party can prove that it is
liable for less than the entire amount of damages). By encouraging
apportionment, the Restatement (Third) approach mirrors the broader trend
away from joint and several liability. See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Asbestos
Litigation and Bankruptcy: A Case Study For Ad Hoc Public Policy Limitations
on Joint and Several Liability, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 203, 213-15 (2003) (noting the
majority of states have abandoned the "traditional doctrine" of joint and several
liability). This trend is partially ascribable to the biased targeting of deep-
pocketed defendants that tends to accompany joint and several liability. See
Joanna M. Shepherd, Tort Reforms' Winners and Losers: The Competing Effects
of Care and Activity Levels, 55 UCLA L. REV. 905, 920 (2008) ("Critics argue
that these Uoint and several liability] rules are unfair because they fail to
distribute liability equitably among defendants."). This targeting of deep-
pocketed defendants is often found in the EPA's liability-recoupment practices.
See Jason E. Panzer, Note, Apportioning CERCLA Liability: Cost Recovery or
Contribution, Where Does a PRP Stand?, 7 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 437, 451
("[Tihe EPA only focuses on a few financially viable PRPs to shoulder the entire
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apportionment.173  Accordingly, judicial interpretations have
used Burlington III as guidance on the types of evidence that
may be used, whether sua sponte apportionment is
appropriate, and the extent of the burden PRPs must meet in
order to demonstrate a reasonable basis for apportionment.
Commentators disagree on whether Burlington III should
be interpreted broadly or narrowly. 74 Some view the holding
as significantly lowering the burden defendants must meet to
apportion, and thus avoid joint and several liability.17 s For
example, in his proposed "Restatement" for apportioning
CERCLA liability, Professor Alfred R. Light asserted that
Burlington III lowers the showing necessary for
apportionment: though PRPs still bear the burden of proving
divisibility, their burden of production is relaxed.'76  Others
view the apportionment holding as unique to the facts of
Burlington III and, therefore, largely irrelevant to most
CERCLA cases, which tend to be far more factually
complex.'7 7 In light of the relative simplicity of the factors the
district court used to apportion, one observer reasoned that
"future litigants . . . may not need to use scientific facts or
evidence to demonstrate a reasonable estimate of the amount
cost of the EPA's remediation or removal measures under [section] 107(a).")
(footnote omitted).
173. Loving v. Sec'y of the Dept. of Health & Human Servs., No. 02-469V,
2009 WL 3094883, at *26 n.26 (Fed. Cl. July 30, 2009) (citing Burlington III,
129 S. Ct. at 1881) ("With regard to apportionment, whether section 433A of the
[Restatement (Second)] differs from section 26 of the [Restatement (Third)] is not
clear. If there is a difference between the two editions, the [Restatement
(Second)] appears controlling.").
174. See Mark Misiorowski & Joel D. Eagle, After the Supreme Court's
Burlington Northern Decision, FOR THE DEFENSE, Aug. 2009, at 14, 16-17,
available at http://www.mlglaw.com/MLG%20Articles.aspx (Select "CERCLA
Defense following Supreme Court Decision in Burlington Northern") (describing
the competing "broad" and "narrow" interpretations of Burlington III).
175. See James Vroman et al., James Vroman, Patricia Boye-Williams
and Michael Strong on Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United
States, LEXISNEXIS EMERGING ISSUES ANALYSIS (June 2009),
http://wwwjenner.com/files/tbl-s20Publications%5CRelatedDocumentsPDFsl25
2%5C2533%5CVromanBoye-WilliamsStrong%200n%20BNSFEIC3670-1.pdf.
176. See Light, supra note 169, at 11,058.
177. See e.g., John C. Cruden, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., Env't. & Natural
Res. Div., Speech at the Env't Law Inst.: The Supreme Court's Decision in
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe. Railway Co. v. United States (May 29, 2009),
available at http://www.justice.gov/enrd/1306.htm (theorizing that the burden
for apportionment remains the same after Burlington III, and that the holding
was specific to the case's facts, which were "not typical" of CERCLA cases).
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of contamination for which [they are] responsible."'
Regarding sua sponte apportionment, Professor Light's
proposed "Restatement" of apportionment asserted that, after
Burlington III, "a court may independently perform an
apportionment analysis and limit liability even if not
advanced by [a PRP.l7
III. NEW QUESTIONS RAISED, EXISTING QUESTIONS
UNANSWERED
Burlington III is fraught with loose ends. In the
apportionment section of the holding, Justice Stevens applied
the "Chem-Dyne approach"' that the circuit courts have
universally applied to CERCLA apportionment,'18  yet his
opinion upheld an apportionment based on less precise
calculations and derived from less sophisticated evidence
than was previously thought necessary.18 2 The unforthcoming
wording of the opinion made clear that apportionment
required a "reasonable basis,"' 3 but left unexplained the
source of this standard and the types of evidence that PRPs
may use to meet this standard.'8 4 Divergence has
characterized the decision's short history, as commentators
disagree on the requirements for a post-Burlington III
divisibility showing and, more broadly, on whether
Burlington III substantially alters the divisibility inquiry, or
merely reaffirms prior apportionment jurisprudence.'
Moreover, the district court's apportionment employed a
considerably large "margin of error" to account for its
178. Misiorowski & Eagle, supra note 174, at 17.
179. Light, supra note 169, at 11,058.
180. Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1881 (2009).
181. See id. at 1881 (citing In re Bell Petroleum Servs., 3 F.3d 889, 901-02
(5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 268 (3d
Cir. 1992); O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v.
Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171-73 (4th Cir. 1988)).
182. See id.; cf. Oswald, supra note 76, at 334 ("[Tjhe practical effect of the
majority approach [to divisibility] has been blanket application of joint and
several liability for CERCLA cleanup costs.").
183. See Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. at 1881 (citing United States v. Chem-
Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1983)) ("CERCLA defendants
seeking to avoid joint and several liability bear the burden of proving that a
reasonable basis for apportionment exists.").
184. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
185. See Misiorowski & Eagle, supra note 174, at 17 (summarizing the
competing approaches for interpreting Burlington III); compare Vroman et al.,
supra note 175, with Cruden, supra note 177.
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"calculation errors." However, it is unclear whether the
Burlington III majority opinion intended to ratify margin of
error-based apportionment or simply upheld the district
court's margin of error solely because it fortuitously arrived
at the same result it would have without the margin.'8
Justice Stevens acknowledged that "traditional and
evolving principles of common law" control the scope of
CERCLA liability.8 8  Therefore, even after deciphering the
standard applied in Burlington III, whether the Court
intended that standard to remain controlling if these
"evolving principles" move away from the Burlington III
standard is ambiguous.' Notably, the Supreme Court
declined to apply the Restatement (Third) of Torts to
apportionment, 90 yet this decidedly pro-apportionment
approach is becoming increasingly widespread."'' Therefore,
the future role of the Restatement (Third) in CERCLA
apportionment requires clarification.
IV. MAKING SENSE OF BURLINGTONIII
A. A Return to the Pure Restatement (Second) of Torts
Approach to Liability Apportionment
Through its extensive references to section 433A of the
Restatement (Second), Burlington III makes clear that the
Restatement (Second) figures prominently in apportionment
analysis under CERCLA, but does not discuss the difficulties
that inhere when applying section 433A to CERCLA."
186. See Burlington I, Nos. CV-F-92-5068 OWW, CV-F-96-6226 OWW, CV-F-
96-6228 OWW, 2003 WL 25518047, at *91 (E.D. Cal. July 15, 2003), affd in
part, rev'd in part sub nom. United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co.,
479 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 2007), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009).
187. See generally Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009).
188. Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. at 1881 (quoting United States v. Chem-Dyne
Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808 (S.D. Ohio 1983)).
189. See id.
190. Justice Stevens's opinion makes no mention of the Restatement (Third),
even though it was briefed by the Railroads. See Brief for Petitioners, supra
note 143, at 33. One court interpreted this to mean that the Restatement
(Third) does not apply to apportionment analysis under CERCLA. See Loving v.
Sec'y of the Dept. of Health & Human Servs., No. 02-469V, 2009 WL 3094883,
at *26 n.26 (Fed. Cl. July 30, 2009) (citing Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. at 1881).
191. See sources cited supra note 172 and accompanying text (explaining the
policy rationales underlying the judicial trend toward the Restatement (Third)).
192. See generally Burlington III, 128 S. Ct. at 1880-81.
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Using the Restatement (Second) corresponds with the
approach ostensibly taken by the circuit courts,9 but does
nothing to quell the oft-expressed trepidation courts
experience when attempting to meld section 433A with
CERCLA. 9 4 This unease derives from the disparate purposes
underlying the provisions; as one court explained, "the 'fit'
between [section] 433A and CERCLA is actually quite
unclear: [section] 433A focuses on causation while CERCLA is
a strict liability statute."9 s This ambiguity is compounded by
the fact that Burlington III was decided amongst an ironic
backdrop where most courts viewed apportionment as "a rare
scenario,"' despite the fact that they based their analyses on
a standard that would apportion whenever there is "an
estimate based on reasonable assumptions."97
Justice Stevens's majority opinion in Burlington III does
not inform its readers of anything not otherwise discernable
from the cluster of circuit court decisions addressing the
apportionment inquiry.' It recites the now-familiar maxims
that CERCLA "[does] not mandate joint and several liability
in every case,"'99 that Restatement (Second) section 433A is
"the universal starting point" for divisibility analysis under
193. See United States v. Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706, 717 (8th Cir. 2001)
("The universal starting point for divisibility of harm analysis in CERCLA cases
is the Restatement (Second) of Torts . . . ."); United States v. Twp. of Brighton,
153 F.3d 307, 318 (6th Cir. 1998); In re Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc., 3 F.3d 889,
895 (5th Cir. 1993).
194. See United States v. Capital Tax Corp., 545 F.3d 525, 535 n.9 (7th Cir.
2008); see also Aaron Gershonowitz, Joint and Several Liability in Superfund
Actions: When is Environmental Harm Divisible? PRPs Who Want to be Cows,
14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 207, 236 (2003) ("A number of courts have suggested
that a rule of divisibility based on causation is problematic . ... ).
195. United States v. Capital Tax Corp., 545 F.3d 525 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing
Hercules, 247 F.3d at 715-16).
196. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chi. v. N. Am. Galvanizing &
Coatings, Inc., 473 F.3d 824, 827 n.3 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Centerier Serv. Co.
v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 348 (6th Cir. 1998) ("[R]arely if
ever will a PRP be able to demonstrate divisibility of harm, and therefore joint
and several liability is the norm."); Illinois v. Grigoleit Co., 104 F. Supp. 2d 967,
979 (C.D. Ill 2000) ("[1It is rare for a responsible party to be able to demonstrate
divisibility of harm, and therefore joint and several liability is the norm.").
197. Gershonowitz, supra note 194, at 231 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 433A cmt. d (1965)) (emphasis added).
198. See generally cases cited supra note 10.
199. Burlington III, 128 S. Ct. 1870, 1881 (2009) (citing United States v.
Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 807 (S.D. Ohio 1983)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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CERCLA, 200 and that "CERCLA defendants seeking to avoid
joint and several liability bear the burden of proving that a
reasonable basis for apportionment exists."20' Thus, one
might easily conclude, Burlington III leaves intact the
confusion surrounding the interplay between section 433A
and CERCLA.20 2 Burlington III, however, is illuminating not
for what it says, but for what it does: while it recites the same
law as the Ninth Circuit (and, for that matter, all circuit
courts that had addressed CERCLA divisibility), it reached
an opposite result.20 3 Therefore, ascertaining the governing
apportionment standard post-Burlington III requires
analyzing the facts and outcome of Burlington III to
determine which legal framework the opinion corresponds
with. By backtracking from the outcome of Burlington III in
light of the facts of that case, it becomes clear the Restatement
(Second) governs apportionment cases under CERCLA.204
1. Achieving Equitable Results While Banning Equitable
Considerations: Irony in the Restatement (Second)
Approach
As A & F Materials and similar holdings demonstrate,
several courts believed consideration of equitable principles
was necessary to avoid gross unfairness to PRPs threatened
with the entire cost of a cleanup.20 5 Even courts following the
majority "Chem-Dyne" approach, rejecting equitable
200. Id.
201. Id. (citing Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 810).
202. Cf United States v. Capital Tax Corp., 545 F.3d 525 (7th Cir. 2008)
(citing United States v. Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706, 715-16 (8th Cir. 2001))
("[Tihe 'fit' between [section] 433A and CERCLA is actually quite unclear. . . .").
203. Namely, it finds a reasonable basis for apportionment where the Ninth
Circuit did not.
204. See infra part IV.A.1.
205. See, e.g., United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D.
Ill. 1984); Allied Corp. v. Acme Solvents Reclaiming, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1100,
1100 (N.D. Ill. 1988). The A & F Materials opinion held that rigid application of
joint and several liability that ignores equitable considerations "must be
avoided because both Houses of Congress were concerned about the issue of
fairness, and joint and several liability is extremely harsh and unfair if it is
imposed on a defendant who contributed only a small amount of waste to a site."
A & F Materials, 578 F. Supp. at 1256. This judicial concern for PRPs is,
perhaps, not misplaced since the average cost of cleaning a CERCLA site is
around thirty million dollars. John M. Hyson, "Fairness" and Joint and Several
Liability in Government Cost Recovery Actions Under CERCLA, 21 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 137, 145 n.32 (1997).
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considerations,"0 sometimes lamented this approach's
inherent unfairness and rigidity.207 The Chem-Dyne approach
is criticized heavily for its arguably unfair targeting of
defendants with deep pockets, even when they are no more
culpable than their shallow-pocketed counterparts.0
Notwithstanding these criticisms, Burlington III makes clear
that the majority approach towards the role of equity is
correct, and reliance on equitable factors in the
apportionment analysis is error.0 Yet despite spurning
equitable considerations, Burlington III has the overall effect
of ameliorating the harsh results inherent in joint and several
CERCLA liability by easing the burden PRPs must meet in
order to apportion liability; this is a decidedly equitable result
because it makes apportionment a realistic argument for
PRPs who contributed a very small fraction of the
contamination, but who would otherwise lack the means to
meet a difficult burden of proof.210
206. See supra notes 80-103 and accompanying text (describing the majority
approach to liability apportionment under CERCLA).
207. See Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 909 F. Supp. 1154, 1164 (N.D.
Ind. 1995) (describing imposition of full liability on a single PRP as an
"inequity"). One commentator compellingly argued that ignoring equitable
factors was not only unfair, but also contrary to congressional intent:
By placing such a heavy burden on defendants, it seems that one of the
concerns of Congress in passing CERCLA has in fact been realized.
Congress apparently deleted the language imposing joint and several
liability from CERCLA as a concession to those opposed to the uniform
imposition of joint and several liability regardless of the facts of a
particular case. By following the strict rule laid down in Chem-Dyne,
federal courts that have adopted the Chem-Dyne approach are doing
precisely what they acknowledge Congress intended to avoid. Rather
than actually examining the facts of a particular case, a court following
Chem-Dyne places an enormously heavy burden on defendants ....
Patrick S. Martin, Comment, The Legacy of Chem-Dyne: Searching for Equality
In CERCLA Cost Recovery Actions, 25 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 909, 922 (1994)
(internal citations omitted).
208. See Shepherd, supra note 172, at 919 ("[Joint and several liability]
allows plaintiffs to collect all of their damages from a deep-pocket defendant,
even if that defendant contributed only modestly to causing the damages."); cf
Panzer, supra note 172, at 451 ("[T~he EPA only focuses on a few financially
viable PRPs to shoulder the entire cost of the EPA's remediation or removal
measures under [section] 107(a)."); Note, Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste
Litigation, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1511, 1530 (1986) ("[TIhe EPA has no incentive to
sue all potential defendants if it can rely on joint and several liability to recover
from a few wealthy defendants.").
209. See Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1882 n.9 (2009) ("Equitable
considerations play no role in the apportionment analysis . . .").
210. See Appleton Papers, Inc. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., No. 08-C-16,
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Burlington III accomplishes this relaxation of the
preconditions for apportioning liability by aligning the
apportionment burden for CERCLA PRPs with the
Restatement (Second).211 Under the Restatement (Second),
apportionment should be performed when there is a rough
approximation of a defendant's contribution to the damage. 2 12
Furthermore, when a defendant contributes in some
quantifiable manner to a harm having multiple causes, there
is a "reasonable assumption that the respective harm done is
proportionate to that number."2 13 Burlington III implicitly
mimicked this assumption of proportionality by upholding the
district court's assumption that the harm attributable to the
Railroads was proportionate to the time that the Railroads
owned the site, and to the portion of land they owned.214
This holding markedly contrasts with the Ninth Circuit's
approach, which demanded "precision"215 and exemplified the
more stringent mentality widely adopted by the circuit
courts.216  The Ninth Circuit's heightened requirements are
particularly transparent in their rejection of the district
court's time-based allocation.21 7 In rejecting this variable, the
Ninth Circuit observed that "[tihe fraction [based on time] it
chose assumes constant leakage on the facility as a whole or
constant contamination traceable to the facility as a whole for
2009 WL 3931036, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 18, 2009) (noting that Burlington III
"eased the standards" for apportionment).
211. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965); cf Burlington III,
129 S. Ct. at 1881 (citing exclusively to the Restatement (Second) and courts
following its approach in detailing the law governing the case's apportionment
issue).
212. See In re Bell Petroleum Servs., 3 F.3d 889, 904 n.19 (5th Cir. 1993)
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965)) ("[Elvidence sufficient
to permit a rough approximation is all that is required under the [Restatement
(Second)].").
213. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A cmt. d (1965) (emphasis
added).
214. See Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. at 1876-77 (describing the district court's
calculations that were based on geographical and temporal variables); cf.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A cmt. d (stating that it is reasonable to
assume that harm done to a crop by two persons' cattle is proportionate to the
number of cattle each allowed onto the cropland).
215. Burlington II, 520 F.3d 918, 944-45 (9th Cir. 2008), rev'd 129 S. Ct.
1870 (2009).
216. See id.; see also, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th
Cir. 1988); O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989).
217. See id. at 945 ("[The] simple fraction based on time that the Railroads
owned the land cannot be a basis for apportionment.").
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each time period."2 18 In contrast, the Restatement (Second),
as applied by the Supreme Court, expressly condones
apportionment based on precisely these sorts of reasonable
assumptions. 219  These parallels between Burlington III and
the Restatement (Second) are aptly demonstrated by the
comments and illustrations accompanying Restatement
(Second) section 433A."o Comment d provides that CERCLA-
like harms (i.e. harms not "severable into distinct parts") may
nevertheless be apportioned where there is a reasonable basis
for doing so. 221' The majority's decision to apportion where
chemical intermingling has muddled would-be "distinct parts"
directly mirrors these illustrations from the Restatement,
demonstrating that courts should treat chemical
intermingling cases as apportionable "comment d" harms.2 22
Therefore, it appears the Restatement (Second)-long
recognized as the "starting point"22 3 for joint and several
liability-is also its ending point in the post-Burlington III
era for apportioning liability based on divisibility of harm."'
By aligning the divisibility inquiry with the Restatement
(Second), Justice Stevens's opinion approved the
apportionment approach of Chem-Dyne.22 5  The court in
Chem-Dyne held CERCLA liability should dovetail with
"traditional and evolving principles of common law."226
Therefore, Justice Stevens's apportionment opinion
represents his interpretation of the current, "evolved"
218. Burlington II, 520 F.3d at 945.
219. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A cmt. d (1965); accord
Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009).
220. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A cmts. d, i (1965); see
discussion supra Part IV.A.1.
221. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 433A cmt. d (1965).
222. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1.
223. United States v. Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706, 717 (8th Cir. 2001).
224. Notably, Justice Stevens observed that the courts of appeals have
acknowledged that "[t]he universal starting point for divisibility of harm
analyses in CERCLA cases is [section] 433A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts." Burlington III, 129 U.S. at 1881 (citing Hercules, 247 F.3d at 717;
United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1507 (6th Cir. 1989)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Having acknowledged that "starting point," his
opinion continued to outline the applicable law. See id. The remainder of the
opinion's explanation of the applicable law contained not one citation to a source
differing from the Restatement (Second) indicating that the "end point" in
apportionment analysis differed from this "starting point." See id.
225. See Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. at 1880 (citing United States v. Chem-
Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983)).
226. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
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doctrine of common law liability apportionment. 2 27  By
upholding an apportionment that relied on factors sufficient
to satisfy the "reasonable assumptions" and "rough
approximations" of the Restatement (Second),228 yet
insufficient to meet the Ninth Circuit's heightened
requirements,2 2 9 the holding implies that common law
liability apportionment has evolved to-and not beyond-the
Restatement (Second) approach.230 Because several circuit
courts demanded more than the Restatement (Second)
requires, Burlington III appears to discredit their standards
for apportionment by returning to the pure Restatement
(Second) approach.23 1
2. Evidentiary Ramifications of Burlington III
Burlington III also alters the status quo of apportionment
analysis by broadening the types of evidence PRPs may use to
meet their apportionment showing, and in doing so eases the
burden on PRPs by enabling them to use the evidence
reasonably available to them.23 2 Burlington III deemed the
Railroads' length of land ownership coupled with the area of
that land to be sufficient bases for apportionment.2 3 3 This
227. See Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. at 1880 (citing Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp.
802).
228. See In re Bell Petroleum Servs., 3 F.3d 889, 904 n.19 (5th Cir. 1993)
("[E]vidence sufficient to permit a rough approximation is all that is required
under the [Restatement (Second)]."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A
cmt. d (1965).
229. See Burlington II, 520 F.3d 918, 952 (9th Cir. 2008) (reversing the
district court's apportionment).
230. See supra notes 223-25 and accompanying text; cf Oswald, supra note
76, at 308 ("The Restatement reflects the modern common law approach to joint
and several liability.").
231. See Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. at 1880 (requiring only a reasonable basis
for apportionment). But see, e.g., O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178-79 (1st Cir.
1989) (assuming that "responsible parties rarely escape joint and several
liability" due to the very strenuous burden of proving divisibility).
232. Cf Robert M. Guo, Note, Reasonable Bases for Apportioning Harm
Under CERCLA, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 317, 341 (2010) (citing Mark F. Misiorowski
& Joel D. Eagle, The Diminishing Role of Science in CERCLA After Burlington
Northern v. Santa Fe, 40 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1205 (2009) (noting that, under a
broad interpretation of Burlington III, PRPs "may not need to present
sophisticated scientific evidence to demonstrate a reasonable basis for
apportionment").
233. See Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1884 (2009) ("[W]e conclude that the
District Court reasonably apportioned the Railroads' share of the site
remediation costs at 9%.").
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suggests that apportionment evidence need not be
scientifically complex,23 4 and overturns the contrary view
from the pre-Burlington III era when courts demanded
"specific evidence documenting the whereabouts of [the
PRP's] waste at all times after it left their facilities ... [,"235
and "reject[ed] simple source or volume evidence of
contaminants as means of apportionment.""' Thus, the
Court sanctioned apportionment using the "simplest of
considerations" 2 37 by relying on the Restatement (Second)
approach.3
This change will inevitably make apportionment a
realistic argument for nearly all PRPs, who typically lack
sufficient data to fingerprint every movement of their
chemicals.23 9 PRPs will be able to demonstrate readily
available and commonsense measurements, such as their
property's boundaries and the time they owned that
property.24 0  This approach has the added advantage of
allowing judges to work with the commonsense evidence they
are most comfortable with. One commentator explained this
judicial preference for simplified evidence: "[cilosely related to
the unavailability of the toxicological and epidemiological
evidence necessary to perform toxic apportionments is the
reluctance of courts and counsel to make use of such data.
Courts historically have been uncomfortable with the
admission of statistical evidence and with the relevant
234. See id.
235. O'Neil, 883 F.2d 176, 182; cf. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d
160, 172 (4th Cir. 1988) ("[TIhe district court could not have reasonably
apportioned liability without some evidence disclosing the individual and
interactive qualities of the substances deposited there.").
236. Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 836 F. Supp. 1049, 1088 (D. N.J. 1993)
(citing O'Neil, 883 F.2d at 183 n.11; Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 172).
237. Burlington II, 520 F.3d 918, 943 (9th Cir. 2008).
238. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A cmt. c (1965) (using time
period as an example of a reasonable manner for apportioning harm based on
divisibility).
239. See Burlington II, 520 F.3d at 944 (recognizing the difficulty of meeting
the heightened burden of proof, and sympathizing with the Railroads by calling
their failure to keep these records "quite understandable"). One commentator
recognized that certain types of evidence would allow PRPs to satisfy the
stringent apportionment standard imposed by pre-Burlington III courts, but
recognized that "evidence of this kind is rarely present." Developments in the
Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 208, at 1529.
240. See id.
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statistical principles."24 ' Therefore, interpreting Burlington
III as relaxing evidentiary standards makes the evidence
necessary for apportionment commensurate with the evidence
available to PRPs, and the type of evidence preferred by
courts.
B. Using Margins of Error to Account for Uncertainties in
Apportionment Calculations
Burlington III upheld an apportionment that employed a
50 percent margin of error in its calculation.242 In so doing, it
implicitly sanctioned apportionment based on uncertain
evidence containing gaps in proof, provided the uncertainty is
quantified through a margin of error.24 3 The implications of
the Court's ratification of the "margin of error" approach raise
the question: where, within a court-established margin of
error, should liability be apportioned? By its very nature, a
margin of error entails recognizing that, although a PRP's
contribution to the contamination falls inside a range, where
precisely it falls within that range is unknowable.24 4
Therefore, exactly where within the margin a court
apportions liability is based on what it (admittedly) could not
ascertain through available evidence. Accordingly, where
objective evidence alone fails to precisely apportion-
necessitating a margin of error-any placement within that
margin is necessarily grounded in subjective considerations,
such as a balance of the equities or, perhaps even worse, a
hunch. Therefore, it is imperative to formulate an
interpretation of Burlington III that reconciles the allowable
margin of error with the Court's directive that equitable
241. Gerald W. Boston, Toxic Apportionment: A Causation and Risk
Contribution Model, 25 ENVTL. L. RPTR. 549, 634 (1995).
242. See Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1883 (2009) (approving the district
court's apportionment and its use of a margin of error).
243. That the Supreme Court allowed apportionment based on less-than-
certain evidence is not surprising, since the Restatement (Second) itself
demands only a reasonable basis for apportionment. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965); see generally supra Part IV.A (explaining the
hand-in-hand relationship between the Restatement (Second) and Burlington
IlTs apportionment holding).
244. See generally Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. at 1883 (noting that the district
court knew based on the evidence that the Railroads' liability was less than 10
percent, but that they could not determine the precise percentage of harm
caused by the them).
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considerations may not be considered during apportionment
analysis.24 5
1. Upwardly Adjusted Within-the-Margin
Apportionment
Since courts are unable to use equitable considerations
after the trail of objective evidence runs cold,246 some
systematic standard for setting within-the-margin liability is
necessary to prevent inconsistent and arbitrary liability
assignments that rely on disallowed considerations.
Logically, this standard should employ one of three
approaches: (1) assigning liability at the margin's lowest
point, (2) at its highest point, or (3) at its midpoint. 247 These
standards further respective policies of: (1) erring in favor of
the PRP to avoid overburdening it, (2) applying a moderate
approach in recognition that, most likely, the actual damage
is somewhere other than the margin's extremities, and (3)
erring towards caution to avoid outcomes that will saddle the
government with non-compensable costs.
When choosing among these interpretational approaches,
the policies underlying CERCLA offer guidance to courts,
with the Supreme Court-approved margin of error in
Burlington III serving as a guidepost.2 48 This policy inquiry
reveals that CERCLA's foremost goal is ensuring that "those
responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical
poisons bear the costs and responsibility for remedying the
harmful conditions they created . . . ."24 One must also
recognize that "since CERCLA is a remedial statute, itf ...
245. See id. at 1882 n.9 ("Equitable considerations play no role in the
apportionment analysis . . .
246. Id.
247. Common sense limits a margin adjustment approach to these three
options because any other option would create a sense of arbitrariness.
Arbitrariness gives rise to an inference that disallowed equitable
considerations, rather than objective evidence, are determining the within-the-
margin apportionment. See generally id.
248. See id. at 1882-83 (discussing the margin of error used by the district
court, and ultimately upholding the apportionment).
249. United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D.
Minn. 1982); cf United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 173 (4th Cir.
1988) (citing United States v. S.C. Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984,
995 & n.8 (D. S.C. 1985)) ("[Mlaking the governments whole for response costs
was the primary consideration [of CERCLA]."); see also supra notes 5 & 6 and
accompanying text.
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should be construed broadly to avoid frustrating the federal
purpose."25 0  Accordingly, within-the-margin liability should
be set at a percentage that ensures the PRP pays fully for the
damage it caused. Moreover, that liability should be assigned
"broadly" in order to ensure PRPs do not underpay.25 1 Only
one of the three approaches described earlier is consistent
with the above criteria: the approach assigning liability at the
zenith of the margin of error. This approach eases PRPs'
burdens in cases where liability cannot be calculated
precisely, but, by shouldering them with any liability that
they fail to account for, prevents PRPs from parlaying this
imprecision to their advantage.2 52 Thus, the government is
not "left holding the bag"253 when PRPs (who bear the burden
of proving a reasonable apportionment basis)254 fail to produce
ample evidence supporting a precise calculation.
2. Unrestricted Breadth of Margins of Error
Another question raised by Burlington III is how wide a
margin of error may be without offending the requirement
that the "facts contained in the record reasonably supportH
the apportionment of liability."25 5 In Burlington III, the
Supreme Court upheld a 50 percent margin of error without
expressing apprehension toward the wide breadth of that
margin.25 The Court did, however, find it important that
250. United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 837-38 (4th
Cir. 1992) (emphasis added).
251. Id.
252. Cf. Light, supra note 169, at 11,061. In an illustration accompanying
Professor Light's proposed post-Burlington III "Restatement" of apportioning
CERCLA liability, he notes that it is appropriate to hold a PRP liable for 9
percent of damages despite the court's calculations indicating it is liable for only
6 percent of damages; this is done by "[alllowing for calculation errors . . . ." See
id.
253. Burlington II, 520 F.3d 918, 930 (9th Cir. 2008), rev'd 129 S. Ct. 1870
(2009).
254. Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1881 (2009) ("CERCLA defendants
seeking to avoid joint and several liability bear the burden of proving that a
reasonable basis for apportionment exists.");
Where the tortious conduct of two or more actors has combined to bring
about harm to the plaintiff, and one or more of the actors seeks to limit
his liability on the ground that the harm is capable of apportionment
among them, the burden of proof as to the apportionment is upon each
such actor.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(2) (1976).
255. Burlington III, 128 S. Ct. at 1882-83 (2009).
256. See id.
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"[tihe District Court's detailed findings make it abundantly
clear . . . that the spills of hazardous chemicals that occurred
on the Railroad parcel contributed to no more than 10 percent
of the total site contamination."2 5 7 Thus the Court was
concerned not with the breadth of the margin, but with
whether that margin-however wide it may be-encompassed
the PRP's actual contribution to the pollution, as
demonstrated by objective evidence.2" Courts should assign
liability at a margin's loftiest point; if courts perform that
upward adjustment and the margin itself encompasses the
PRP's actual contribution, Burlington III appears to place no
restrictions on the width of that margin.2 59
Some commentators do not view Burlington III as
condoning margins of error, and instead interpret Burlington
III as a narrow, fact-specific holding that upheld the district
court's apportionment due to the unusual circumstances of
the case.2 60 Under that view, Justice Stevens's apparent
endorsement of the margin of error is merely a pragmatic
ends-justify-the-means approach that upheld the margin
solely because it corresponded with the correct apportionment
by sheer chance.2 6 1 That interpretation, however, is incorrect
because it reads too narrowly both the district court's use of
the margin of error and Justice Stevens's opinion alike. The
district court employed a 50 percent margin of error to
account for "calculation errors."2 62  Nothing in the district
court's opinion limited this "calculation errors" measurement
to errors within the chosen factors for apportionment.2 63
Rather, the "calculation errors" language is broad enough to
encompass errors in selecting the apportionment variables
257. Id. at 1883 (emphasis added).
258. See id.
259. See generally Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. at 1882-83 (upholding a margin
of error even though the margin was large and uncertain because the
apportioned damages were set at or greater than the actual damages caused by
the PRP).
260. See, e.g., Cruden, supra note 177 ("The Supreme Court did not change
the burden on defendants to prove divisibility.").
261. See, e.g., Cruden, supra note 177.
262. Burlington I, Nos. CV-F-92-5068 OWW, CV-F-96-6226 OWW, CV-F-96-
6228 OWW, 2003 WL 25518047, at *91 (E.D. Cal. July 15, 2003), affd in part,
rev'd in part sub nom. United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 479
F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 2007), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009).
263. See id.
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themselves.2" Thus in Burlington III, the Court did not fault
the district court for its actual calculations.2 Instead, it
faulted the district court for choosing to partially base its
calculations on a variable that was not sufficiently supported
by the evidence-specifically, the volumetric-related factor."6
In other words, the narrow reading of "calculation errors"
fails because it only considers the numerical values taken
from the evidence, whereas the Supreme Court faulted the
district court for considering certain variables in the first
place-not for its actual calculations. Therefore, Burlington
III endorses the margin of error approach; it did not uphold
the margin of error simply because it coincidentally arrived at
the correct answer. To the contrary, the margin of error was
designed to account for precisely these sorts of uncertainties
in choosing the calculation variables themselves.2 67
C. A Future Role for the Restatement (Third) in Liability
Apportionment Under CERCLA?
The Burlington III decision implicitly adopted the
Restatement (Second) of Torts approach to liability
apportionment, but it does not stand for the proposition that
the Restatement (Second) will forever be the governing
standard.2 6 8 The Court's opinion ignored the portion of the
Railroads' brief based on the Restatement (Third).26 9 By doing
this, Burlington III seems to reject the more recently
developed Restatement (Third) approach to apportionment.270
However, the precedential effect of this rejection is
complicated because Burlington III also held that the
264. See id.
265. Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1883 (2009).
266. See id. ("The District Court's conclusion that those two chemicals
accounted for only two-thirds of the contamination requiring remediation finds
less support in the record .....
267. See generally id.
268. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
269. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 143, at 33 (arguing that the
Restatement (Third) supports apportionment of the Railroads' liability); cf
Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. at 1880-82 (applying the Restatement (Second)
approach, and making no mention of the Restatement (Third)).
270. See Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. at 1880-84; see also Loving v. Sec'y of the
Dept. of Health & Human Servs., No. 02-469V, 2009 WL 3094883, at *26 n.26
(Fed. Cl. July 30, 2009) (citing Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. at 1881) ("With regard
to apportionment, whether section 433A of the [Restatement (Second)] differs
from section 26 of the [Restatement (Third)] is not clear. If there is a difference
between the two editions, the [Restatement (Second)] appears controlling.").
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controlling apportionment standard is based on the evolving
notions of common law.' Accordingly, Burlington III's
holding speaks to only the current evolutionary state of
common law apportionment analysis.27 2 By applying the
Restatement (Second) rather than the Restatement (Third),
Burlington III held that the Restatement (Second) was the
correct standard at the time of decision, but left unaddressed
the appropriate apportionment standard should the
continuum of common law evolution eventually deviate from
the Restatement (Second).273
Burlington III does not stand for the proposition that the
Restatement (Second) is forever the applicable apportionment
standard. If, for example, a widespread judicial adoption of
the Restatement (Third)2 approach to apportioning liability
were to occur, it would be unbefitting to interpret the
Restatement (Second) as the "evolved" state of common law.17 1
In that scenario, of course, continued evolution would have
rendered the Restatement (Second) approach outdated.
This hypothetical shift away from the Restatement
(Second) is not at all fanciful because joint and several
liability is waning overall as the judicial trend moves toward
the apportionment-friendly approach exemplified by the
Restatement (Third).276  The Restatement (Third) observes
that trend, and seeks to update accordingly; it notes that
"[elven for topics that were addressed in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, the nearly universal adoption of
comparative responsibility by American courts and
legislatures has had a dramatic impact."77 The Restatement
271. Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. at 1881 (quoting United States v. Chem-Dyne
Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808 (S.D. Ohio 1983)).
272. See id.
273. See id.
274. See sources cited supra note 172 and accompanying text (discussing the
policy rationales underlying the trend away from joint and several liability).
275. See Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. at 1881 (quoting Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp.
at 808).
276. See sources cited supra note 172 and accompanying text (describing
criticisms of joint and several liability, and the corresponding shift away from
joint and several liability, as exemplified by the Restatement (Third)); see also
Frank J. Vandall, A Critique of the Restatement (Third), Apportionment as it
Affects Joint and Several Liability, 49 EMORY L.J. 565, 570 (2000) (observing
that the impetus for the Restatement (Third) provisions regarding liability
apportionment "appears to have been to prevent a corporate defendant who is
slightly at fault from being held liable for a large portion of the damages.").
277. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 26
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(Third) encourages apportionment through its underlying
policy that "[n]o party should be liable for harm it did not
cause, and an injury caused by two or more persons should be
apportioned according to their respective shares of
comparative responsibility.""' Its accompanying Reporters'
Note effectuates this policy by, for example, relaxing
evidentiary standards:
Divisible damages may occur when a part of the damages
was caused by one set of persons in an initial accident and
was then later enhanced by a different set of persons. The
passage of time may affect whether evidence is available
to determine the magnitude of each indivisible part. As
long as any person caused only a part of damages,
however, the damages are divisible, irrespective of the
timing.279
This common law evolution toward the apportionment-
friendly Restatement (Third) approach is encapsulated by the
Reporters' observation that the "clear trend over the past
several decades has been a move away from pure joint and
several liability."28 o
Due to this trend towards apportionment, the
Restatement (Second) standard may soon become inapplicable
to apportionment analysis under CERCLA, notwithstanding
its application in Burlington III.281 Under this interpretation,
a move away from the Restatement (Second) would not
contravene Burlington III because Burlington Is
apportionment holding was based on Chem-Dyne, a case that
recognized these ever-changing standards.2 8 2 The citations to
Chem-Dyne, therefore, create built-in flexibility in Burlington
1I.283
cmt. a (2003).
278. Id. at. § 26 cmt. a.
279. Id. at § 26, Reporters' Note to cmt.f, at 332.
280. Id. at § 17, Reporters' Note to cmt. a, at 149 (2003).
281. Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1881-82 (2009) (applying the
Restatement (Second) approach).
282. See United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808 (S.D. Ohio
1983); accord Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. at 1881-82 (applying the "Chem-Dyne
approach" to apportioning CERCLA liability).
283. Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. at 1881-82.
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V. THE NEW APPORTIONMENT STANDARD
ARTICULATED
Burlington III is properly read as an endorsement of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts approach to apportioning
liability based on divisibility of harm.2 8 Since the
Restatement (Second) advocates apportionment based on
rough approximations ascertained through "reasonable
assumptions," Burlington III significantly lightens the burden
of proof on PRPs.285 Accordingly, it is no longer accurate to
treat apportionment as "a very difficult proposition," and
courts should greet apportionment arguments with open-
mindedness rather than skepticism.2 "
Although Burlington III banned equitable factors from
the apportionment analysis, it allowed courts to use their
discretion in initiating sua sponte apportionments.2 " During
sua sponte apportionment, a court may use equitable
considerations in its threshold determination of whether to
apportion on its own accord, while still respecting the ban on
equitable considerations during the apportionment
calculation itself. Furthermore, rather than balance the
equities among individual PRPs, the Restatement (Second)
approach adopted by Burlington III recognizes that PRPs in
general are recurrently overburdened, and lightens their
burdens in response.288
Courts applying the Restatement (Second) should seek
guidance from the comments and illustrations accompanying
the Restatement (Second). These comments confirm this
apportionment-friendly approach as correct and offer concrete
examples of applying apportionment to the sort of chemical
intermingling scenarios characteristic of CERCLA harms.28 9
284. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
285. See In re Bell Petroleum Servs., 3 F.3d 889, 904 n.19 (5th Cir. 1993)
("[Elvidence sufficient to permit a rough approximation is all that is required
under the [Restatement (Second)]."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A
cmt. d (1965); see also discussion supra Part IV.A.
286. Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp., 53 F.3d 930, 934 n.4 (8th Cir.
1995); see discussion supra Part IV.A.
287. See Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. at 1882 n.9 ("Equitable considerations
play no role in the apportionment analysis . . . ."); Light, supra note 169, at
11,063 ("Under Burlington Northern . . . a court may apportion liability sua
sponte, even if not advanced by a defendant.").
288. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
289. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A cmts. d, i (1965); see also
discussion supra notes 219-21and accompanying text.
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A corollary of the Restatement (Second) approach is that
courts should be receptive of simplistic evidence, such as the
geographical and temporal evidence used in Burlington 111.290
This comports with the underlying purpose of joint and
several liability in the CERCLA context: enable the
government to recover its expenditures by making "those
responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical
poisons bear the costs and responsibility for remedying the
harmful conditions they created."291  By requiring
sophisticated and expensive evidence for apportionment,
previous decisions made apportionment viable for only deep-
pocketed PRPs who could afford to produce such evidence.
Ironically, those were the very PRPs who could best serve
CERCLA's goal of compensating the government for its
cleanup costs. 29 2 Courts should therefore interpret Burlington
III as allowing divisibility based on readily available,
commonsense evidence because this interpretation is even-
handed towards all PRPs without undermining CERCLA's
goal of fully compensating the government.2 93
When presented with an apportionment argument, courts
should determine whether the evidence presents a
reasonable, non-arbitrary basis for apportionment. Courts
should then assess the appropriate margin of error for their
apportionment calculations.294 Finally, courts should set the
apportionment-seeking PRP's liability at the uppermost point
encompassed by that margin.295 Because PRPs are subject to
strict joint and several liability, a PRP that caused very little
contamination-or even none-could theoretically be charged
for the entire cleanup under CERCLA.296 Thus,
apportionment is a desirable tool for avoiding these heavy-
290. See Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. at 1880-83.
291. United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D.
Minn. 1982); see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
292. See Reilly Tar & Chem., 546 F. Supp. at 1112 (explaining the goal of
compensation underlying CERCLA); Elizabeth F. Mason, Comment,
Contribution, Contribution Protection, and Nonsettlor Liability Under CERCLA:
Following Laskin's Lead, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 73, 74-75 (1992) ("One of
CERCLA's basic aims . . . was to ensure that PRPs would bear the cost of
remedying the toxic dangers that they caused.").
293. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
294. See Misiorowski & Eagle, supra note 174, at 18 (explaining
scientifically-grounded methods of liability apportionment available to courts).
295. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.
296. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.
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handed results. On the other hand, it is undesirable to deny
compensation to the government, and therefore "Congress
intended for those proven at least partially culpable to bear
the cost of the uncertainty."29 7 By upwardly adjusting
margins of error, courts will be able to harmonize these goals
by allowing PRPs to avoid the harshness of joint and several
liability while simultaneously ensuring that the government
is fully compensated.
The margin of error approach accounts for this
"uncertainty," and then via the upward adjustment, saddles
PRPs-rather than the government-with the burden of that
uncertainty. While encouraging governmental compensation,
the margin of error also treats PRPs fairly by allowing them
to use the margin of error to account for imprecision rather
than being denied apportionment outright. Thus, the dual
policies of ensuring the government is compensated and not
burdening PRPs disproportionately-seemingly at odds-are
harmonized.2
Burlington III acknowledged that CERCLA's joint and
several liability scheme is not static, but is meant to change
along with "evolving principles of common law."299 Courts
applying Burlington III should recognize that by applying the
Chem-Dyne approach, Burlington III confirms the
evolutionary treatment of CERCLA liability.o00 Therefore,
courts should not read Burlington III to require blind
adherence to the apportionment principles of the Restatement
(Second)."o' Instead, courts presented with CERCLA-related
divisibility questions must vigilantly track developments in
liability-apportionment jurisprudence, and update their
standards to reflect these developments. 302 Theoretically, the
evolution of joint and several liability may take any form, and
courts should modify their apportionment standards
accordingly.
297. O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 179 (1st Cir. 1989).
298. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
299. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808 (S.D. Ohio
1983), quoted in Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1881 (2009).
300. See Burlington III, 129 S. Ct. at 1881-83.
301. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
302. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
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VI. CONCLUSION
While Burlington III has clearly altered liability
apportionment under CERCLA, the details and extent of the
alteration are not immediately apparent from the holding.
Viewing the apportionment decision in light of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, however, a coherent
explanation for Burlington III emerges that will enable courts
to iron out the opinion's ambiguities. By returning the
apportionment inquiry to the Restatement (Second) of Torts
framework and accounting for uncertain apportionment
calculations through margins of error,303 courts can correctly
interpret Burlington III and effectuate its goal of unifying
divisibility of harm analysis under CERCLA. Looming in the
background of this interpretation, however, is the fact that
Burlington III linked its holding to the much earlier Chem-
Dyne decision, similarly basing the apportionment inquiry on
evolving notions of common law.304 Accordingly, Burlington
III is an of-the-moment decision that does not control or
predict future apportionment standards, but instead
recognizes that when apportioning CERCLA liability, the
only constant is change."'
303. See discussion supra Part V.
304. See Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 810, quoted in Burlington III, 129 S. Ct.
at 1881; see also discussion supra Part IV.C.
305. See discussion supra Parts IV.C., V.
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